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Editorial 
It has been nearly ten years now since the Aarhus Conven-
tion entered into force and imposed on parties and public 
administrations obligations regarding access to informa-
tion, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice. Since then, practitioners have gained diverse ex-
periences on the practical application of the three pillars’ 
provisions, and their implementation into national laws 
and related issues, e.g. enforcement. This issue of the elni 
Review includes valuable insights into this matter.  
Special focus in this issue is placed on the currently dis-
cussed revision of the IPPC Directive takes a special place 
in this issue of the elni Review. This topic will also be 
continued in the next issue of the journal to reflect the 
ongoing discussion. As previously announced, elni is 
planning an elni Conference (see page 46 of this journal), 
a major event by the end of 2010, on the Industrial Emis-
sions Directive. Therefore, you are invited to send us your 
contribution for the elni Review and, if you are willing to 
discuss it with others, you are naturally welcome to submit 
a proposal for the event, too. Soon, there will be an official 
call on our webpage (www.elni.org) providing further 
information on the conference.  
This issue 2/2009 of the elni Review offers the following 
contributions:  
In her article on the Conference “EU Enforcement Policy 
of Community Environmental law as presented in the 
Commission Communication on implementing European 
Community Environmental law” which took place on 
8 July 2009 in Brussels, Marta Ballesteros discusses the 
implementation of European Community Environmental 
Law enforcement and its interaction with the Aarhus 
Convention and other European Laws.  
“The direct effect of the Aarhus Convention as seen by the 
French ‘Conseil d’Etat’” is the subject of the article by 
Julien Bétaille. His article provides detailed insights on 
the implementation and practical application of the Aarhus 
Convention in France.  
“Practical application of Article 9 of the Aarhus Conven-
tion in EU countries: Some comparative remarks” by 
Pavel ?erný discusses several specific topics from this 
field which can be considered crucial to legal protection of 
the environment in practice. The article also addresses the 
contributions and discussions presented at the „Interna-
tional conference on the implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention in practice”.  
The article “Environmental Inspections at the EU: The 
imperative to move forward” by Ana Barreira reflects the 
point of view of the EEB on compliance and enforcement 
of European Environmental Law.  
Further Christian Schaible addresses the EEB’s position 
on the revision of the IPPC Directive in his article “Cur-
rent discussions on the proposal for an Industrial Emis-
sions Directive: Stronger role for Best Available Tech-
niques?”.  
National specifics of the IPPC Directive in practice are 
shown from a British point of view by Lesley James. She 
comments on the “Aberthaw Power Station: An IPPC case 
study”.  
“Why patents are crucial for the access of developing 
countries to Environmentally Sound Technologies” is 
explained by Michael Benske.  
This issue of elni Review also provides two conference 
reports:  
Nicola Below reports on the elni forum 2009 “The Direc-
tive on Industrial Emissions and its implementation in 
national law – key issues and practical experiences”, 
which took place at CEDRE in Brussels on 14th May 2009.  
The contribution by Marie-Catharine van Engelen reports 
on the congress “European Environmental Law in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands”, which took place in Rotterdam 
on 15th May 2009.  
Moreover, this edition of elni Review covers some inter-
esting news on the German failure to codify its fragmented 
environmental law, a special edition of elni Review, which 
will be published next year, the elni Conference 2010, 
recent EIA developments, and positive developments in 
Slovakian access to justice.  
The next issue of the elni review will not have an over-
arching focus. Contributions on the IED/IPPC revision 
process are nevertheless very welcome. Please send con-
tributions on this topic as well as other interesting articles 
to the editors by mid-January 2009.  
Nicolas Below/Martin Führ  
October 2009 
Conference on Environmental Law and Policy 
in the European Union 
 
on Thursday 19th of November 2009 
at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
“Environmental Law and Policy in the 
European Union: 
The Legacy of the Treaty of Amsterdam” 
 
On the occasion of the inaugural lecture of Professor Marc 
Pallemaerts on 20 November 2009, the Centre for Envi-
ronmental Law is organising a conference. 
 
Please confirm your participation under: 
http://www.jur.uva.nl/cel 
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The direct effect of the Aarhus Convention  
as seen by the French ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
Julien Bétaille 
1 Introduction 
France ratified the Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters on the 
8th July 2002 and the Convention came into force on 
the 6th October 2002.  
Seen as an instrument of ‘environmental democracy’1, 
the impact of the Convention in France has been rela-
tive. On the one hand, the Convention did not imply 
many legislative changes2. The 2002 law relating to 
the ‘proximity democracy’3 has provided the main 
legislative change4 due to the Convention through an 
improvement of the ‘public debate’ procedure. On the 
other hand, the judge has had an important role to 
play. Citizens and non-governmental organisations 
saw the Convention as an opportunity to improve their 
rights and invoked the Convention before the courts. It 
gave the judge the opportunity to interpret the Con-
vention and fix its legal impact in French law. The 
judge limited direct effects of the Aarhus Convention 
to a few stipulations and “choose a soft interpretation 
of this treaty’s requirements”5.  
Given the international law principle “pacta sunt 
servanda”, France must fully apply the Aarhus Con-
vention stipulations. Art. 55 of the French Constitu-
tion determines the conditions for an international 
treaty to be integrated in the domestic legal system. As 
                                                          
                                                          
1  See the remarkable article: “The Aarhus Convention, Universal Instrument 
of Environmental Democracy”. M. Prieur, La Convention d'Aarhus, instru-
ment universel de la démocratie environnementale, special RJE 9 – 29 
(1999), p. 22. 
2  France has implemented access to information, public participation and 
access to justice before the adoption of the Convention; see the 1978 law on 
the access to administrative documents, the 1983 law of the democratisation 
of public enquiries and the 1995 law on the reinforcement of environmental 
protection that implemented an approval procedure (‘agrément’) for non-
governmental organisations, notably to give them opportunities to accede to 
justice.  
3  Loi n° 2002-276, 27 February 2002 relative à la démocratie de proximité, 
JORF du 28 February 2002. ‘Loi’ means a law (act). It is adopted by the Par-
liament. 
4  Since the Convention came into effect, there has been no other new law on 
environmental information, public participation or access to justice in envi-
ronmental matters. However, a bill is to be discussed at the Parliament on 
public enquiries, and another bill will be prepared on environmental informa-
tion relating to GMO. In terms of access to justice, it has to be noted that 
Art. 14 of the 2006 ‘ENL’ law limited access to justice of environmental non-
governmental organisations with regard to planning law. See Chapter III of 
the Projet de loi n° 155 portant engagement national pour l'environnement; 
“Le gouvernement va devoir légiférer sur les OGM”, Le Monde, 19 August 
2009, available at www.lemonde.fr; Art. 14 of the loi n° 2006-872, 13 July 
2006 portant engagement national pour le logement (article L600-1-1 of the 
Planning code). 
5  G. Lefloch, La Convention d'Aarhus devant le juge administratif, 157 Les 
petites affiches 4 – 9 (2008), p. 4: “il a opté pour une interprétation souple 
des exigences posées par ce traité”. 
has already been mentioned, the Aarhus Convention 
fulfils the Art. 55 conditions of ratification6 and publi-
cation7. As the French legal system is monist, interna-
tional treaties are supposed to be part of domestic 
law. A consequence of the monism is that the treaties’ 
direct effect is presumed, as soon as Art. 55 conditions 
are fulfilled. In a monist view, “treaties shall normally 
be presumed to produce direct effects in domestic law, 
which means creating legal rules that individuals are 
entitled to rely on before domestic courts”8. In a dual-
ist legal system, such as the UK system, international 
treaties have to be transposed to produce effects in 
domestic law. Moreover, the French system allows the 
direct effect to be automatic if it is foreseen explicitly 
by the text of the treaty. Regarding the Aarhus Con-
vention, if some scholars involved in its elaboration 
considered its direct effect9, there is no mention of it 
within the text of the Convention. However, in this 
case, the direct effect is not excluded. It only implies 
that it is not regulated by international jurisdictions.  
As a consequence, it seems to be a duty of domestic 
jurisdictions to decide whether a treaty produces 
direct effects or not. In effect, the impact of a conven-
tion such as the Aarhus Convention at the national 
level depends on the national jurisdictions interpreta-
tion. To what extent does the Aarhus Convention pro-
duce direct effects in France?  
Our study is focused on the case law of the French 
administrative highest jurisdiction, the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’. The ‘Cour de cassation’10, as far as we know, 
6  Loi n° 2002-285, 28 February 2002 autorisant l'approbation de la convention 
sur l'accès à l'information, la participation du public au processus décision-
nel et l'accès à la justice en matière d'environnement, JORF, 1 March 2002, 
p. 3904.  
7  Décret n° 2002-1187, 12 September 2002 portant publication de la Conven-
tion d’Aarhus, JORF, 21 September 2002, p. 15563. ‘Décret’ is the equiva-
lent of a regulation. It is adopted by the government. 
8  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, n° 
292942, AJDA 1527 – 1535 (2007), p. 1533: “les traités doivent être norma-
lement présumés produire des effets directs en droit interne, c’est-à-dire 
créer des règles de droit dont les particuliers peuvent se prévaloir devant le 
juge national”. 
9  See J. Jendroska, Accès à la justice: remarques sur le statut juridique et le 
champ des obligations de la Convention d’Aarhus dans le contexte de 
l’Union européenne, special RJE (2009), (to be published): “In fact already 
during the negotiations many of the negotiators were careful to draft some 
specific provisions in a very detailed and precise way, with a view to making 
them capable of having direct effect. Such an approach was supported by 
many delegations from outside the EU, in particular those in which the con-
stitutional arrangements provide, for example, a definition of the direct effect 
of international treaties”. 
10  To make it more comprehensible to non-French persons, the French system 
could be described as follows: There are 3 highest courts in the French legal 
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never had to pronounce on any of the Aarhus Conven-
tion provisions11.  
Before going into more detail, some information 
should be provided so that the French context can be 
better understood. Indeed, some aspects of adminis-
trative procedure taking place before the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ are essential. For legal disputes before admin-
istrative jurisdictions, including the ‘Conseil d’Etat’, 
a ‘Commissaire du gouvernement’12 is designated. 
His function is to analyse the dispute. His role can be 
compared to the Advocate General role at the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. During the audience, he has to 
propose to the judges a solution to the dispute13. 
These findings are called “conclusions”. They repre-
sent an opinion given to the judges about the case. The 
findings are read during the audience14. The judges 
can choose whether the findings of the “Commissaire 
du gouvernement” are taken on board or not.  
                                                                                        
It is first of all necessary to understand how the ‘Con-
seil d’Etat’ assesses the direct effect of the treaties 
(see section 2 of this article) before we see how the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ applies it to the Aarhus Convention 
(see section 3 of this article).  
2 The assessment of the direct effect of treaties  
The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ uses criteria to distinguish 
whether the stipulations of a treaty produces direct 
effects. If a stipulation does not produce direct effects, 
an individual cannot invoke it against domestic law 
provisions. Indeed, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ does not dis-
tinguish the invocability and the direct effect in terms 
of the stipulations of international treaties as it does 
for European directives.  
system. The ‘Conseil constitutionnel’ is the constitutional court. The ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ is the supreme administrative jurisdiction. The ‘Cour de cassation’ 
pronounces on any trials that are not included in the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ compe-
tence, i.e. trials where there is no public body involved.  
11  All French courts judgements, from the time at which the Aarhus Convention 
entered into force to the present, can be found at www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
12  Since February 2009, the ‘Commissaire du gouvernement’ is called the 
‘Rapporteur public’. As most of the judgments that we refer to predate Feb-
ruary 2009, we use the term ‘Commissaire du gouvernement’. 
13  In spite of its name, the ‘Commissaire du gouvernement’ is independent of 
the government. 
14  These findings are very helpful for understanding the judgment of the court. 
The ‘conclusions’ of the ‘Commissaire du gouvernement’ sometimes appear 
like short law treaties. This is particularly the case for the Ronny Abraham 
ones on the direct effect of international treaties, provided on the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ judgment ‘GISTI’ in 1997. We largely refer to these ‘conclusions’ and 
to other ones within this article.  
“Conclusions sur CE, …” refers to the findings provided by the ‘Commissaire 
du gouvernement’ on the CE case,… . A reference to a judgment is refer-
enced for example as follows: “CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, n° 
292942”. CE means ‘Conseil d’Etat’ and is followed by the date, the name 
and the number of the judgment. 
2.1 The direct effect criteria  
The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ usually determines the direct 
effect of a treaty stipulation by stipulation and adopts 
as such a ‘casuistic’ approach15.  
Ronny Abraham16, the ‘Commissaire du gouverne-
ment’ designated in the famous case called “GISTI”17, 
tried to systematise the direct effect criteria used by 
the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ in his findings to that case. Even 
though Ronny Abraham distinguished only two crite-
ria, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law usually uses three 
criteria. Such an approach can be however criticised.  
2.1.1 The three criteria18 
These criteria are cumulative. To produce direct ef-
fects, the stipulation shall fulfil every criterion. Thus, 
the treaty shall first provide “subjective” rights to 
individuals. Then, it has to be a self-executing treaty 
and the wording of its stipulations needs to be suffi-
ciently precise.  
(i) The ‘subjective rights’ criterion  
The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ distinguishes two kinds of stipu-
lations and assesses whether the object of such stipula-
tion is to regulate only the relations between states or 
if it is to regulate the individual’s situation, notably 
through the allocation of ‘subjective rights’19. If the 
object is only to regulate relations between state par-
ties to the treaty, no direct effect is recognised. In 
contrast, if individuals are the recipients of the norm, 
the direct effect of this stipulation is possible.  
(ii) A self-executing stipulation  
According to this criterion, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ denies 
direct effect to stipulations “formulated in too vague 
terms to be self-sufficient to themselves and to be able 
to be immediately applied in some particular cases”20. 
                                                          
15  However, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law has not always been stable. Also in a 
recent case, CE, 9 November 2007, Ligue pour la préservation de la faune 
sauvage et la défense des non-chasseurs (See J. Matringe, Observations 
sous CE, 9 November 2007, Ligue pour la préservation de la faune sauvage 
et la défense des non-chasseurs, n° 289063 et CE, 11 January 2008, n° 
292493, 1 RGDIP 210 – 212 (2008), p. 210), the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ judged, 
with regard to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to 
Agriculture (19 March 1902), that “all the stipulations” do not produce direct 
effects. The ‘Cour de cassation’, the other French supreme court, altered its 
initial position and now judges the direct effect stipulation by stipulation, like 
the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ (see Cass., 1ère civ., 14 June 2005, n° 04-16.942, Re-
cueil Dalloz (2005), p. 2790). 
16  Thereafter, Ronny Abraham was a judge at the International Court of Justice 
from 2005 to 2009.  
17  This case stayed famous because Ronny Abraham presented, as “Commis-
saire du gouvernement”, a kind of direct effect theory. Even if the “Conseil 
d’Etat” did not follow Ronny Abraham, his findings helped a lot for the com-
prehension of the “Conseil d’Etat’ interpretation. 
18  See also R. Chapus, Droit administratif général, t. 1, 165-3° - 1145, (15th 
edition, 2001). 
19  The French language uses the same word for the two English words ‘law’ 
and ‘right’. To distinguish it, lawyers use ‘droits subjectifs’ when speaking 
about rights and ‘droit objectif’ when speaking about the law. 
20  R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, Section, 23 April 1997, GISTI, 3 RFDA 
585 – 594 (1997), p. 590: “formulées dans des termes trop généraux pour 
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Another norm should not be necessary to apply the 
main norm. Thus, a self-executing norm is “immedi-
ately effective without further action, legislation or 
legal steps”21.  
The theoretical justification of this criterion can be 
found in the “old French law principle according to 
which the judiciary is not a law source”22. The judge 
cannot create law. If a stipulation of a treaty needs 
another norm to be applied, the judge cannot create 
this other norm and, as a consequence, cannot apply 
this stipulation.  
To be self-executing, a norm usually needs to be suffi-
ciently precise in itself and should not require another 
norm. However, according to Ronny Abraham, the 
general character of the norm does not necessary en-
tail a lack of direct effect23. For example, Art. 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights has been 
given direct effect by the ‘Conseil d’Etat’24, in spite of 
its general character. As a consequence, in spite of 
their closeness, the precision and the self-executing 
character of a norm have to be distinguished.  
(iii) The wording of the stipulation  
The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ also looks at the wording of the 
stipulation itself. For example, Yann Aguila recalls 
that Ronny Abraham “doubted that it would be possi-
ble to distinguish a wording such as ‘The state parties 
commits to guarantee…’, which excludes the direct 
effect, and the wording ‘The state parties guaran-
tee…’ which does not exclude, or imply, the direct 
effect”25. In spite of these doubts, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
uses this criterion. In fact, as Yann Aguila stated in 
one of his findings26, speaking to the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
judges, “we wonder whether the evolution of your case 
law led you to forget [the Ronny Abraham scepticism] 
and to often limit [your assessment of the direct effect] 
to the wording criterion, which is, it is true, the easiest 
criterion to use”27.  
                                                                                        
se suffire à elles-mêmes, et pour être susceptibles d’une application immé-
diate à des cas particuliers”. 
21  See http://www.dictionary.law.com. 
22  H Tigroudja, Droit administratif et droit international: le juge administratif 
français et l’effet direct des engagements internationaux, 1 RFDA 156 – 157 
(2003), p. 157: “dans le principe bien ancré en droit français selon lequel le 
pouvoir judiciaire n’est pas source de droit”. 
23  R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, Section, 23 April 1997, GISTI, supra 
note 20, p. 591. 
24  See CE, Ass., 19 April 1991, Belgacem et Dame Babas, Rec. Lebon, p. 152. 
25  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, supra 
note 8, p. 1532: “Il doutait ainsi qu’on puisse faire la différence une formule 
telle que ‘Les Etats parties s’engagent à garantir…’, qui exclurait l’effet di-
rect, et l’expression ‘Les Etats parties garantissent…’ tel ou tel droit, qui, 
elle, ne l’exclurait pas – voir l’impliquerait”. 
26  Yann Aguila has been ‘Commissaire du gouvernement’ for several cases 
relating to the Aarhus Convention and has closely examined its direct effect.  
27  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, supra 
note 8, p. 1533: “nous nous demandons si une certaine evolution de votre 
jurisprudence ne vous a pas conduit à oublier la mise en garde du commis-
saire du gouvernement dans l’affaire GISTI et à vous en tenir, le plus sou-
2.1.2 Criticism of the criteria 
“We can wonder whether it is time, regarding current 
developments of international law, to reassess the 
international treaties’ direct effect case law”28. The 
main criticisms concentrate on the ‘subjective rights’ 
criterion and the wording criterion. The self-executing 
criterion is not really subject to criticism.  
(i) The wording criterion  
Ronny Abraham has largely criticised the wording 
criterion. He refused to see it as an autonomous crite-
rion and expressed “the largest scepticism”29 about it. 
He also refused to see in it a sufficient criterion30, i.e. 
it is not sufficient to limit the direct effect assessment 
to this criterion. It is, however, what the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ sometimes does31. But, as the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
does not provide much explanation in its judgments, it 
is quite difficult to know which criterion, in a particu-
lar case, is not fulfilled. When the findings of the 
‘Commissaire du gouvernement’ do provide informa-
tion on it, the direct effect assessment remains quite 
vague. Indeed, the subjectivity of this criterion seems 
to be quite useful for judges. However, the vagueness 
of the assessment combined with the subjectivity of 
this criterion is not satisfying. Ronny Abraham urged 
for the role of this criterion to be limited to a subsidi-
ary one, i.e. to be used as an indication to confirm the 
assessment of the two other criteria.  
But, in spite of the wording, the stipulations of the 
treaties are binding most of the time32. As a conse-
quence, state’ parties have to apply it. As Carlo San-
tulli pointed out, the wording criteria used by the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ could lead to a violation of interna-
tional law binding instruments: “The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
case law sometimes hides behind the wording choices 
that refer to the state commitment to go in a certain 
direction, to refuse the direct effect. But, such a posi-
tion can only be criticised, because it leads to refuse 
to cancel the decisions that would go against a treaty 
objective […]. As a consequence, by pretending to 
                                                                                        
vent, au simple critère rédactionnel – qui est, il est vrai, le plus simple à ma-
nier”. 
28  Y. Aguila, L’étendue du contrôle du juge dans les Etats membres, spécial 
RJE (2009), (forthcoming): “On peut se demander si le moment n’est pas 
venu, à la lumière des développements du droit international aujourd’hui, de 
revoir cette jurisprudence sur l’effet direct des traités internationaux”. 
29  See R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, Section, 23 April 1997, GISTI, supra 
note 20, p. 590 et R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, 22 September 1997, 
Mlle Cinar, 3 RFDA 562 – 564 (1998), p. 563: “le plus grand scepticisme”.  
30  R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, 23 April 1997, GISTI, supra note 20, 
p. 590 : “nous avons bien du mal à y voir un critère autonome, suffisant, de 
l’effet direct”. 
31  See Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, 
supra note 8, p. 1533. 
32  A treaty stipulation is not binding for a Party if it is subject to reservations by 
this Party. 
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base its assessment on the wording of the treaty, the 
judge allows to consume a violation”33 of the treaty.  
Moreover, these kinds of wording are inherent to 
international law. Denying direct effect on these 
grounds leads to an exclusion of direct effect most of 
the time, which can seem contrary to the spirit of a 
monist system.  
However, the distinction of this criterion with the self-
executing criterion can be quite difficult. Because the 
lack of precision in the wording can imply that ‘self-
executing’ is lacking, these two criteria are tightly 
linked. This is clearly the case in the European Court 
of Justice judgment ‘Etang de Berre’34. This judgment 
is also very useful for comparing the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
criteria with those of the European Court of Justice.  
(ii) An issue of ‘subjective rights’  
In its judgment ‘Etang de Berre’, the European Court 
of Justice recalled its case law on the direct effect 
assessment: “Regard being had to its wording and to 
its purpose and nature, Article 6(3) of the Protocol 
contains a clear, precise and unconditional obligation 
to subject discharges of the substances covered by 
Annex II to the Protocol to the prior issue of an au-
thorisation by the competent national authorities. The 
strict prohibition on discharges without such an au-
thorisation is not subject, in its implementation or 
effects, to any reservation or to the adoption of any 
subsequent measure. In addition, Annex III to the 
Protocol, to which Article 6(3) refers, lists all the 
factors of which account must be taken with a view to 
the issue of an authorisation”35. As a consequence, if 
the Court refers to the wording and the self-executing 
criteria, the Court does not refer to the object of the 
treaty or a subjective right like the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
does. In fact, in this particular case, Art. 6(1) and 6(3) 
of the Protocol to the Barcelona Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
from Land-based Sources36 were about state obliga-
tions to limit pollution and submit discharges to an 
                                                          
33  C. Santulli, Chronique de droit international, 1 RFDA 145 – 146 (2009), 
p. 145: “La jurisprudence du ‘Conseil d’Etat’ en effet s’abrite parfois derrière 
les choix rédactionnels renvoyant à l’engagement étatique d’œuvrer dans 
une certaine direction, pour refuser l’effet direct. Or, une telle position ne 
peut qu’être critiquée, puisqu’elle conduit à refuser de censurer les déci-
sions qui iraient à l’encontre d’un objectif conventionnel, au motif que, l’Etat 
s’étant engagé à prendre de telles mesures, il n’appartient pas au juge 
(n’est il plus organe de l’Etat ?) de s’y substituer. Ainsi, en prétendant se 
fonder sur les termes de l’engagement international, le juge permet de con-
sommer la violation”. 
34  ECJ, judgement, 15 July 2004, Syndicat professionnel coordination des 
pêcheurs de l'Etang de Berre et de la région, n° C-213/03, Rec. 2004, § 39, 
p. I-7357. 
35  ECJ, judgement, 15 July 2004, Syndicat professionnel coordination des 
pêcheurs de l'Etang de Berre et de la région, supra note 34. 
36  Art. 6: “1. The Parties shall strictly limit pollution from land-based sources in 
the Protocol Area by substances or sources listed in Annex II to this Proto-
col. […] 3. Discharges shall be strictly subject to the issue, by the competent 
national authorities, of an authorisation taking due account of the provisions 
of Annex III […]” 
authorisation. Thus, Art. 6 of the Protocol did not 
provide ‘subjective rights’ to any individual. How-
ever, the Court judged that the Art. 6 stipulations 
“have direct effect, so that any interested party is 
entitled to rely on those provisions before the national 
courts”.  
This leads us to wonder whether the object criterion of 
the treaty is really relevant. In fact, the impact of this 
criterion on the effectiveness of international law in 
France is quite negative. Most of the treaties’ stipula-
tions are binding. When France is a party to a treaty, 
France has to not only guarantee ‘subjective rights’ 
provided by the treaty, but also apply all of its stipula-
tions. In this view, remedies thereby provided to indi-
viduals can be seen as helping the state comply with 
its international commitments. Such remedies are 
useful for preserving the principle of legality, which is 
inherent in the rule of law. However, in this context, 
limiting the direct effect to ‘subjective rights’ does not 
lead to the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ controling the compliance 
of domestic law with the other stipulations of a treaty, 
i.e. the ones that are not ‘subjective rights’. In fact, the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ does not distinguish the direct effect 
and the invocability of the treaties. As a result, an 
individual cannot invoke a non-“direct effect” stipula-
tion and, hence, the judge does not assess the compli-
ance of domestic law to it.  
2.2 The direct effect and the invocability of a treaty  
“The distinction between the direct effect and the 
invocability […] presupposes an individual’s interest 
for the European law to be respected, as itself”37. 
Recognising the invocability of a treaty would mean 
recognising the citizen’s interest for the legality38 to 
be preserved, beyond the benefit of ‘subjective rights’. 
If the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law upholds this distinc-
tion for European directives39, it does not do so for 
international treaties. It is a paradox that citizens have 
received this interest for European directives but not 
for international treaties. The effectiveness of treaties 
appears to be less important than the effectiveness of 
European directives.  
                                                          
37  D. Alland, L’applicabilité directe du droit international considérée du point de 
vue de l’office du juge: des habits neufs pour une vieille dame?, RGDIP 203 
– 244 (1998), p. 235: “la distinction de l’effet direct et de l’invocabilité […] 
suppose un intérêt reconnu des particuliers à voir le droit communautaire 
respecté, ‘en lui-même’". 
38  In this case, it is the compliance between domestic law and every interna-
tional binding stipulation. 
39  The invocability of European directives is not total. In fact, the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ refuses the directive’s invocability against individual administrative 
decisions (CE, 1978, Cohn Bendit), which is contrary to the ECJ position 
(ECJ, 1974, Van Duyn vs Home Office). However, because of the fact that 
the directives create a state obligation to transpose it, it can always be in-
voked against a regulation. This can be a regulation which aims to trans-
pose the directive (CE, 28 September 1984, Confédération nationale des 
sociétés de protection des animaux de France) or not (CE, 7 December 
1984, Fédération française des sociétés de protection de la nature).  
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2.2.1 Case law on the invocability of the treaty  
An international treaty that does not produce direct 
effects can only be invoked before the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
by another state40, not by individuals. In spite of 
Ronny Abraham’s position in favour of this distinc-
tion, a treaty stipulation cannot be invoked if it does 
not produce direct effects. This is the position taken 
by the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ in the case of ‘GISTI’41, which 
was confirmed in the ‘Mlle Cinar’ case42. In his find-
ings on the ‘Mlle Cinar’ case, Ronny Abraham took 
into account and has to follow the position of the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ in the ‘GISTI’ case. Thus, “it is first 
necessary to wonder if this text produces direct effects, 
if not, it could not be invoked”43.  
The current case law confirms this position. For ex-
ample, in terms of the Aarhus Convention it has been 
judged that “[t]he article 8 stipulations of the Conven-
tion […] only creates obligations between state par-
ties to the convention and does not produce direct 
effects in domestic law; [these stipulations] cannot, as 
a consequence, be invoked against the decision 
sued”44. The wording ‘as a consequence’ - ‘par suite’ 
in French - is crucial.  
The ECJ case law is different. Within the European 
judicial system, ECJ allows the invocability of every 
stipulation of such treaties. But, these stipulations can 
only be invoked against EU law which aim to trans-
pose it.45 Certainly, the treaties can be invoked, but 
this cannot be done against European legislation. 
Thus, this position which is more convenient than the 
French one is not completely effective with regard to 
the legality principle. In fact, an act which does not 
aim to transpose a treaty can also violate this treaty. 
For example, a directive concerning Environmental 
Impact Assessment, the aim of which is not to trans-
pose the Aarhus Convention in EU Law, could also 
violate the Aarhus Convention.  
2.2.2 The lack of effectiveness of treaties  
This position does not lead to the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ 
controlling the compliance of domestic law with cer-
tain treaties’ stipulations. But, as mentioned above, the 
                                                          
                                                          
40  See CE, Ass., 15 October 1993, Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et 
d’Irlande du Nord, Rec., p. 287. 
41  CE, Section, 23 April 1997, GISTI, supra note 20.  
42  CE, 22 September 1997, Mlle Cinar, supra note 29. 
43  R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, 22 September 1997, Mlle Cinar, supra 
note 29, p. 563: “il faut d’abord se demander si ce texte est d’effet direct, 
faute de quoi il ne pourrait être utilement invoqué”. 
44  CE, 28 December 2005, Association citoyenne intercommunale des popula-
tions concernées par le projet d'aérodrome de Notre-Dame-des-Landes, n° 
267287, Rec. Lebon, p. 690: “les stipulations de l’article 8 de la convention 
[…] créent seulement des obligations entre les Etats parties à la convention 
et ne produisent pas d’effets directs dans l’ordre juridique interne; qu’elles 
ne peuvent par suite être utilement invoquées à l’encontre de la décision 
attaquée”. 
45  ECJ, 5 October 1994, Allemagne c/ Conseil, affaire C-280/93, Rec. p. 1-
5039, quoted by Ronny Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, 23 April 1997, GIS-
TI, supra note 20, p. 593. 
stipulations of international treaties are binding. The 
“pacta sunt servanda” principle has the effect of oblig-
ing domestic law to comply with the treaties. Accord-
ing to Ronny Abraham, “the incomplete and general 
character of the rule does not remove its normativity, 
and we should not confuse an international treaty, a 
legally binding commitment, with a declaration of 
political intention”46, i.e. hard law, even when vague, 
incomplete and general, is not soft law. Thus, if “a 
vague norm cannot be the base of an individual right; 
it can always be a reference for a compliance con-
trol”47. Moreover, domestic law shall not only comply 
with ‘subjective rights’ created by the treaty, but with 
all its stipulations. Despite its vagueness, such a norm 
can still create an obligation to the state.  
Regarding this case law, the ‘monist’ orientation of 
the French legal system is called into question. Like 
Ronny Abraham, we wonder whether refusing the 
invocability of such international treaties as described 
above would violate Art. 55 of the French Constitution 
which provides the French system with a ‘monist’ 
orientation. In fact, Art. 55 foresees that “[t]reaties or 
agreements regularly approved or ratified have, as 
soon as their publication, an authority superior to that 
of the laws, under reserve, for every agreement or 
treaty, of its application by the other party”48. Indeed, 
the French legal system appears to be a hybrid one, 
positioned between monism and dualism. It is a ‘mo-
nist’ system as far as the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ allows direct 
effects. In fact, the French ‘monist’ orientation, “if it 
would be pure, would also eliminate the problem by 
the inverse extreme”49, i.e. in a ‘pure’ monist system, 
every international law stipulation would produce 
direct effects in domestic law.  
However, in spite of our sense of regret regarding the 
lack of invocability of international treaties, all ob-
servers of the French legal system need to keep in 
mind that since the 1980s, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ has 
made good progress in terms of the integration of EU 
and international law in domestic law.50 In fact, before 
46  R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, Section, 23 April 1997, GISTI, supra 
note 20, p. 593: “Le caractère incomplet et général de la règle ne lui retire 
pas sa normativité, et il ne faut pas confondre un traité international, enga-
gement juridiquement contraignant, avec une déclaration d’intention politi-
que […]”. 
47  R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, Section, 23 April 1997, GISTI, supra 
note 20, p. 593: “Une norme vague ne peut pas servir de base à 
l’établissement d’un droit individuel ; elle peut toujours servir de référence à 
un contrôle de compatibilité”. 
48  French Constitution, 4 October 1958, Art. 55: “Les traités ou accords 
régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité 
supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de 
son application par l'autre partie”. 
49  D. Alland, L’applicabilité directe du droit international considérée du point de 
vue de l’office du juge: des habits neufs pour une vieille dame?, supra 
note 37, p. 220: “si elle était pure, éliminerait aussi le problème par l’extrême 
inverse”. 
50  See L. Dubouis, Bref retour sur la longue marche du ‘Conseil d’Etat’ en 
terres internationales et européennes, in Mélanges en l’honneur de Bruno 
Genevois, Le dialogue des juges 391 – 402 (2009), p. 391. 
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1989 and the famous ‘Nicolo’ case51, the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ judged that he was not allowed to control the 
compliance of an act to a treaty, even if this act would 
be posterior to the treaty.52 Thus, the full invocability 
of international treaties is a step that needs to be taken 
in order to fully integrate international law.  
The fact that the European community has also ap-
proved a treaty allows this lack of distinction between 
direct effect and invocability to be circumvented. The 
treaty is, therefore, a mixed agreement and in this 
case, the treaty is part of the community law. This 
implies that such directives transpose the treaty in 
community law. Contrary to the treaty that cannot be 
invoked by individuals if it does not provide ‘subjec-
tive rights’, the directives can, according to ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ case law, all be invoked by individuals. This is 
the case with the first and the second pillar of the 
Aarhus Convention. Indeed, French individuals cannot 
fully invoke its provisions on access to justice (third 
pillar) as long as the European Council does not adopt 
the directive on access to justice proposed by the 
European Commission.53  
3 The direct effect of the Aarhus Convention  
Since the Aarhus Convention came into force, the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ has not adjudicated on all provisions 
of the Convention. The majority of judgments con-
cerning the Aarhus Convention related to the second 
pillar of the Convention. This pillar seems to raise 
significant implementation issues in France. On the 
one hand, representative democracy is at the heart of 
French democracy. The influence of this model is 
quite important. One of its symbols is the E.N.A. 
(National Administrative School) where most of the 
politicians are trained.54 On the other hand, non-
governmental organisations and citizens are looking 
for ‘real’ participatory procedures that the Aarhus 
Convention is supposed to provide. Most of the largest 
construction projects such as highways, high-speed 
railways or airports are sued before the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’; so non-governmental organisations are some-
times seen by the state as NIMBY55 organisations. 
The Aarhus Convention is systematically invoked, in 
particular Art. 6, 7 and 8 of the Convention.  
Thus, between these two different worlds, the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ has to play its role of arbitration and interpreta-
tion. Direct effect has only been recognised for a few 
                                                          
51  CE, Ass., 20 October 1989, Nicolo, Rec. Lebon, p. 190. 
52  CE, Sect., 1 March 1968, Arrêt Syndicat général des fabricants de semoules 
de France, Rec. Lebon, p. 149. 
53  Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and of the Council on 
access to justice in environmental matters - COM/2003/0624 final - COD 
2003/0246. 
54  Most of the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ members are also trained in this school after 
studying law at University. 
55  NIMBY is the abbreviation for “Not In My BackYard”. 
stipulations of the Convention, and this case law can, 
to some extent, be criticised.  
3.1 Recognition of the Convention’s direct effect  
It is necessary to list the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law in 
terms of the Aarhus Convention.56 As this has been 
carried out very well by Guillaume Lefloch in his 
article “The Aarhus Convention before the administra-
tive judge”57, we shall limit ourselves to recalling and 
updating58 this case law.  
3.1.1 Stipulations that do not produce direct effects 
One of the characteristics of this case law is that, more 
than distinguishing articles of the Convention, the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ distinguishes the direct effect from a 
paragraph to another of the same article. Thus, 
Art. 159, Art. 2(4)60, Art. 5(2)61, Art. 6(4)62, 
Art. 6(6)63, Art. 6(8)64, Art. 6(9)65, Art. 766, Art. 867, 
                                                          
56  Every judicial decision quoted here is available at   
57  n d'Aarhus devant le juge administratif, 157, 
58  d the time period up to August 2008. 
59  ), 
60  nuary 2008, Lesage et de Bouard, see supra note 59. 
des popula-
63  
; CE, 26 October 
65   note 62; CE, 
66  
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
See G. Lefloch, La Conventio
Les petites affiches 4 – 9 (2008), p. 4. 
The Guillaume Lefloch’s article covere
The case law presented below has been updated on the 23 August 2009. 
CE, 11 January 2008, Lesage et de Bouard, n° 292493; AJDA, (2008
p. 69, observations E. Royer, and 3 Environnement, (2008), p. 41, note P. 
Trouilly. 
CE, 11 Ja
61  CE, 11 January 2008, Lesage et de Bouard, see supra note 59. 
62  CE, 28 December 2005, Association citoyenne intercommunale 
tions concernées par le projet d'aérodrome de Notre-Dame-des-Landes, su-
pra note 44, p. 690 and 1143; AJDA 2005, p. 1664, note B. Delaunay; Envi-
ronnement 2006, comm. 40, observations J.-M. Février; CE, 28 December 
2005, Syndicat d'agglomération nouvelle Ouest-Provence, n° 277128, Rec. 
Lebon, p. 588; AJDA 2006, p. 1664; RFDA 2006, p. 203; Environnement 
2006, comm. 39, observations J.-M. Février; CE, 4 August 2006, Comité de 
réflexion, d'information et de lutte anti-nucléaire (CRILAN) et association “Le 
réseau sortir du nucléaire”, n° 254948, Rec. Lebon, p. 382; AJDA 2006, 
p. 1532, observations Y. Jégouzo; CE, 10 November 2006, Association de 
défense du Rizzanese et son environnement et al., n° 275013, Rec. Lebon, 
p. 879, 880, 884 and 957; CE, 15 November 2006, Syndicat mixte du Parc 
naturel régional de la montagne de Reims, n° 291056, Rec. Lebon, p. 702 
and 960: AJDA 2006, p. 2204; Droit Administratif 2007, comm. 9, observa-
tions P. Trouilly; RDI 2007, p. 136, observations L. Marion; CE, 24 January 
2007, Baratelli, n° 286666; CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, n° 
292942: AJDA 1527 – 1535 (2007); CE, 26 October 2007, UFC que choisir 
de la Côte d'Or, n° 291109; CE, 19 March 2008, Commune de Binningen, 
n° 297860: 30 JCP A, 2008, p. 28, note P. Billet; CE, 18 December 2008, 
Collectif pour la protection des riverains de l’autoroute A184, n° 310027; 2 
Construction – Urbanisme, 2009, comm. 17, note G. Godfrin; CE, 
23 February 2009, Fédération transpyrénéenne des éleveurs de montagne, 
n° 292397: 1 RSDA, 2009, p. 65, note H. Pauliat et C. Deffigier; CE, 23 April 
2009, Association France Nature Environnement, n° 306242, 6 Droit Admi-
nistratif, 2009, comm. 89; 19 JCP A., 2009, p. 576; CE, 29 May 2009, Asso-
ciation citoyenne intercommunale des populations concernées par le projet 
d’aéroport de Notre-Dame-des-Landes, supra note 44; CE, 27 July 2009, 
Comité interprofessionnel des vins de champagne, n° 301385. 
CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, supra note 62. 
64  CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, supra note 62
2007, UFC que choisir de la Côte d'Or, supra note 62; 19 March 2008, 
Commune de Binningen, supra note 62; 18 December 2008, Collectif pour 
la protection des riverains de l’autoroute A184, supra note 62. 
CE, 26 October 2007, UFC Que choisir de la Côte d'Or, supra
18 December 2008, Commune de Conflans-Sainte-Honorine, n° 307434. 
CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, supra note 62. 
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Art. 9(3) and Art. 9(5)68 do not produce direct effects 
in French law.  
3.1.2 Stipulations producing direct effects 
The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ recognises the direct effect of 
some stipulations of the Aarhus Convention. Thus, 
Art. 6(2)69, Art. 6(3)70 and 6(7)71 produce direct ef-
fects in domestic law. The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ referred to 
it while recognising direct effect in terms of Art. 6(2) 
and Art. 6(3), Art. 6(1)(a); and the Annex I of the 
Convention can also be seen as producing direct ef-
fects.  
The CRILAN case, which recognised the direct effect 
of Art. 6(2), can be used to look at the direct effect 
criteria relating to the Convention. Art. 6(2) foresees 
that: “The public concerned shall be informed, either 
by public notice or individually as appropriate, early 
in an environmental decision-making procedure, and 
in an adequate, timely and effective manner […]”. 
Recognising direct effect in terms of this stipulation 
implies that the criteria mentioned above are fulfilled.  
Concerning the criterion of the ‘subjective right’, 
Vincent Picard notes: the “obligations created by 
these stipulations exceeds the relations between the 
parties, and create, for the public, a right to informa-
tion”72. Here the ‘subjective right’ criterion is ful-
                                                                                        
ces direct 
nt and consistent frame-
67  CE, 28 December 2005, Association citoyenne intercommunale des popula-
tions concernées par le projet d'Aérodrome de Notre-Dame-des-Landes, 
supra note 62; 15 November 2006, Syndicat mixte du Parc naturel régional 
de la montagne de Reims, supra note 62; 6 June 2007, Commune de Gro-
slay, supra note 62; 26 October 2007, UFC Que choisir de la Côte d'Or, su-
pra note 62; 19 March 2008, Commune de Binningen, supra note 62; CE, 
18 December 2008, Collectif pour la protection des riverains de l’autoroute 
A184, supra note 62; CE, 23 April 2009, Association France Nature Envi-
ronnement, supra note 62. 
68  CE, 5 April 2006, Mme Dupont et al, n° 275742, Rec. Lebon, p. 1042, 1104 
and 1114. 
69  CE, 28 July 2004, Comité de réflexion, d'information et de lutte anti-
nucléaire (CRILAN) et al., n° 254944; Environnement 2004, comm. 121, ob-
servations V. Picard; CE, 20 April 2005, Collectif contre les nuisances du 
TGV de Chasseneuil du Poitou et Migne-Axances et Association Linars 
Nouere Charente, n° 258968 et 259221, Rec. Lebon, p. 974 and 1142; AJ-
DA 2005, p. 1787, note B. Delaunay; CE, 28 December 2005, Syndicat 
d'agglomération nouvelle Ouest-Provence, supra note 62; CE, réf., 9 May 
2006, Fédération transpyrénéenne des éleveurs de montagne et al., n° 
292398, Rec. Lebon, p. 236; AJDA 2006, p. 956; Environnement 2006, 
comm. 67, observations P. Trouilly; CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Gro-
slay, supra note 62; CE, 12 January 2009, Association France Nature Envi-
ronnement, n° 289080, note F.-X. Fort, 5 Droit administratif 2009, comm. 75 
and 4; Environnement 2009, comm. 48, D. Deharbe, 5 Environnement 2009, 
comm. 63; CE, 23 February 2009, Fédération transpyrénéenne des éleveurs 
de montagne, supra note 62, p. 65, note H. Pauliat et C. Deffigier. 
70  CE, ord. réf., 9 May 2006, Fédération transpyrénéenne des éleveurs de 
montagne, see supra note 69; CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, su-
pra note 62; 11 January 2008, Lesage et de Bouard, supra note 59; 
23 February 2009, Fédération transpyrénéenne des éleveurs de montagne, 
see supra note 69. 
71  CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, supra note 62. 
72  V. Picard, Principes généraux du droit de l’environnement, observations 
sous CE, 28 July 2004, n° 254944 et 255050, Comité de réflexion, 
d’information et de lutte anti-nucléaire (CRILAN), et Greenpeace : Juris-Data 
n° 2004-067430, 12 Environnement 18 – 20 (2004), p. 19: “les obligations 
créées par ces stipulations dépassent les seuls rapports entre les Parties, 
instituant un droit pour le public à être informé”. 
filled. The ‘self-executing’ criterion is also fulfilled. 
However, direct effect of these stipulations is limited 
to the Annex I list. In fact, the rest of Art. 6 (Art. 6(1) 
(b) and (c)) are not precisely mentioned in the Con-
vention and thus require another norm to apply. As a 
result, it is not considered ‘self-executing’ by the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’.73 The wording criterion is also sup-
posed to be fulfilled. Thus, Art. 6(2) produ
effects when it applies to a project listed in the An-
nex I.  
In effect, there are very few stipulations which are 
recognised by the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ as producing direct 
effects, i.e. only three paragraphs of the Convention. 
However, it should be noted that, according to a 
judgment such as CE, 28 September 1984, Confédéra-
tion nationale des sociétés de protection des animaux 
de France et des pays d’expression française et au-
tres,74 there could be even fewer. In fact, in this case, 
the ‘Commissaire du gouvernement’ stated that 
Art. 1(1) of the 1968 European Convention for the 
Protection of Animals during International Transport - 
which foresees that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall 
apply the provisions governing the international 
transport of animals contained in this Convention” - 
implies that the rest of the stipulations of the Conven-
tion cannot produce direct effects. Even if this judg-
ment is now old, this article can easily be compared to 
Art. 3(1) of the Aarhus Convention, which stipulates 
that “[e]ach Party shall take the necessary legislative, 
regulatory and other measures, including measures to 
achieve compatibility between the provisions imple-
menting the information, public participation and 
access-to-justice provisions in this Convention, as well 
as proper enforcement measures, to establish and 
maintain a clear, transpare
work to implement the provisions of this Convention”.  
3.2 Limits of the case law  
The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law on the direct effect of 
the Aarhus Convention can sometimes be seen as 
‘subjective’. This can have consequences in terms of 
 Con-the compliance of French law with the Aarhus
vention.  
3.2.1 The subjective aspects of the case law  
Objective criterion, the self-executing criterion “is the 
75object of subjective interpretations” . Even if the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ uses criteria to assess the direct effect 
                                                          
73  See V. Picard, Principes généraux du droit de l’environnement, observations 
sous CE, 28 July 2004, n° 254944 et 255050, Comité de réflexion, 
d’information et de lutte anti-nucléaire (CRILAN), et Greenpeace, see supra 
note 72, p. 19. 
74  CE, 28 September 1984, Confédération nationale des sociétés de protection 
des animaux de France et des pays d’expression française et autres, Rec. 
Lebon, p. 512; AJDA (1984), p. 695, conclusions Jeanneney. 
75  B. Taxil, Les critères de l’applicabilité directe des traités internationaux aux 
Etats-Unis et en France, 1 RIDC, 157 – 176 (2007), p. 166: “critère objectif, 
il fait l’objet d’interprétations subjectives”. 
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of such stipulations, criteria are not a guarantee for 
objectivity76.  
(i) The criticism of the wording criterion  
Yann Aguila compared Art. 6(2)77, which produces 
direct effects, and Art. 6(9)78, which does not produce 
direct effects. According to him, “the only difference 
is with the wording criterion, with the use of the word-
ing ‘Each Party shall make accessible’, criterion 
about which [Ronny Abraham] expressed great reser-
vation”79. Even if those two articles use both the im-
perative form ‘shall’ and are both binding, the ‘Con-
seil d’Etat’ uses the third criterion to deny direct effect 
to Art. 6(9).  
In favour of a revision of the third criterion80, Yann 
Aguila stated that the wording criterion “leads to fine 
distinction between articles, or also between different 
paragraphs of the same article – distinction of which 
the writers of the convention had not necessarily 
thought”81.  
(ii) The debate about Art. 6(4) 
The debate about Art. 6(4) of the Convention resem-
bles the debate on Art. 6(9). Comparisons are useful to 
understand the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law. Once again, 
the wording criterion seems to be crucial and once 
again, Yann Aguila proposed a revision of the ‘Con-
seil d’Etat’ case law. In one of his findings concerning 
the Aarhus Convention he stated: “You recognised 
direct effect to paragraph 2 of (article 6), […] and we 
propose to you to adopt the same solution concerning 
the paragraph 4, even if this one mostly seems to im-
pose obligations to state parties”82. However, we do 
                                                          
                                                                                        
76  Several interpretations are possible. For example, according to Jerzi 
Jendroska “in the light of the settled case-law of the European Court of Jus-
tice it seems evident that the Aarhus Convention as such is capable of hav-
ing direct effect”. See J. Jendroska, Accès à la justice: remarques sur le sta-
tut juridique et le champ des obligations de la Convention d’Aarhus dans le 
contexte de l’Union européenne, RJE special 2009, (forthcoming). 
77  “The public concerned shall be informed, either by public notice or individu-
ally as appropriate, early in an environmental decision-making procedure, 
and in an adequate, timely and effective manner”. 
78  “Each Party shall make accessible to the public the text of the decision 
along with the reasons and considerations on which the decision is based”. 
79  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sous CE, 6 June 2007, Commune de Groslay, supra 
note 8, p. 1533: “La seule différence tient au critère purement rédactionnel, 
avec l’emploi de la formule ‘chaque partie communiqué’, critère sur lequel, 
précisément, le commissaire [Ronny Abraham] émettait les plus grandes 
reserves”. 
80  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sous CE, 6 juin 2007, Commune de Groslay, n° 
292942, supra note 8, p. 1533: “Un réexamen de cette jurisprudence, par 
exemple au sujet de la convention d’Aarhus – qui se prêterait bien à cet 
exercice, à la fois par son importance en droit de l’environnement, et par la 
diversité de ses stipulations – pourrait être envisageable”. 
81  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 3 October 2008, Commune d’Annecy, 1 RJE 
85 – 106 (2009), p. 96: “conduit à procéder à de subtiles distinctions entre 
articles, voire même entre les paragraphes d’un même article – distinctions 
auxquelles n’avait pas nécessairement songé les rédacteurs de la conven-
tion”. 
82  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 28 December 2005, Association citoyenne 
intercommunale des populations concernées par le projet d’aéroport de No-
tre-Dame des Landes, n° 267287, non published document, 2005, p. 6: 
“Vous avez reconnu un effet direct au paragraphe 2 du même article, […] et 
not completely agree with the last part of this sen-
tence. Thus, it is necessary for Art. 6(4) to be analysed 
according to the three criteria. Art. 6(4) provides that 
“[e]ach Party shall provide for early public participa-
tion, when all options are open and effective public 
participation can take place” – a stipulation which, 
according to the ‘Conseil d’Etat’, does not produce 
direct effects. 
The first criterion is about the recipients of the stipula-
tion: states or individuals. Even the wording does not 
resemble Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), i.e. a ‘pure’‘subjective right’ 
wording like “Everyone has the right to…”; Art. 1 of 
the Aarhus Convention provides that “each Party shall 
guarantee the rights of […] public participation in 
decision-making”. We agree with Yann Aguila that 
the wording “each party shall…” refers more to state 
obligations than the Art. 6(2) wording. But, like the 
Para. 2, which produces direct effects, Para. 4 is one 
of the modalities of a ‘subjective right’, the right to 
participate that is recalled in Art. 1 and in the Pream-
ble of the Convention83. As a consequence, recognis-
ing that Para. 2 and Para. 4 of Art. 6 are two sides of 
the right to participate would lead the judge to recog-
nise that these two paragraphs both fulfil the first 
criterion. Looking at the self-executing criterion, a 
comparison of the English version of the two para-
graphs shows that they are more or less equal. As the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ recognised Para. 2’s direct effect, it is 
implied that Para. 2 is self-executing. Thus, it would 
be logical to conclude that Para. 4 is self-executing. 
Or, by contrast, if we consider that Para. 2 needs an-
other norm to specify who shall inform the public, 
when, how, etc., it is implied that Para. 4 needs a norm 
to specify exactly when “all options are open”. Case 
law coherence seems to require the same treatment for 
Para. 2 and Para. 4.  
However, at this stage, it is necessary to turn to the 
issue of translation. The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ interpreta-
tions are based on the French text of the Convention. 
The French translation is an official one, i.e. this ver-
sion of the text is as legally binding as the English or 
the Russian version. However, the text of the Conven-
tion was elaborated and negotiated in English. The 
English version of Art. 6(4) states that “[e]ach party 
shall provide for early participation…”. The French 
version is expressed as follows: “Chaque partie prend 
des dispositions pour que la participation du public 
commence au début de la procedure…”. According to 
our own translation, this means: “Each party adopts 
nous vous proposons de retenir la même solution s’agissant de son para-
graphe 4, même si celui-ci paraît surtout imposer des obligations aux Etats 
Parties”.   
We would like to thank Yann Aguila for allowing us to use these findings. 
83  “Recognizing also that every person has the right to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her health and well-being, and the duty, both individually 
and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment for 
the benefit of present and future generations” 
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provisions for public participation to start at the be-
ginning of the procedure…”. Thus, it is necessary to 
analyse the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law through this 
translation. In this context, the self-executing charac-
ter of Art. 6(4) can be doubted. In fact, Para. 4 pro-
vides that the state will adopt domestic provisions to 
organise early participation. Confronted by this kind 
of issue, French judges do not have to take into ac-
count the English version and can limit interpretation 
to the French version. But, looking at the reality of 
international forums shows that the time when interna-
tional treaties were negotiated in French has unfortu-
nately passed. As the Aarhus Convention was negoti-
ated in English, we could believe that the parties’ will 
is better reflected in the English version. However, 
this can pose problems in terms of the uniformity of 
the Aarhus Convention application at the national 
level. Concerning the wording criterion applied to 
article 6(4), it could be argued that this article is not 
sufficiently precise. But, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’, in the 
case ‘Mlle Cinar’, recognised direct effect to Art. 3-1 
of the New York Convention on the rights of the child, 
which refers to the “best interests of the child”. We do 
believe that this notion is not easier to assess than it is 
for the judge to know what “effective participation” - 
as mentioned in Art. 6(4) of the Aarhus Convention - 
is. As Ronny Abraham has said, this situation can be 
compared to the situation where the judge has to apply 
a general principle84 or Art. 8 of the ECHR, which has 
been recognised by the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ as producing 
direct effects85. Thus, vagueness does not cancel out 
normativity.  
If we only look at the English text, without examining 
aspects of translation, the only difference between 
these two paragraphs is the wording “[e]ach party 
shall…”, which is different to the wording in para. 2: 
“The public concerned shall be informed…”. In effect, 
moving from the positive character of Art. 6(2) to the 
negative character of Art. 6(4) seems to draw a dis-
tinction between the direct effect of these two para-
graphs.  
However, this very fine difference and the issue of 
translation can have important consequences on the 
domestic law compliance to the Aarhus Convention. 
3.2.2 Consequences on compliance  
As mentioned above, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law 
distinguishes direct effects from one paragraph to 
another of the same article, notably for Art. 6 of the 
Convention. This has consequences for compliance 
with the Convention. In fact, this implicitly leads the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ to select the paragraphs of the Con-
vention for which domestic law compliance will be 
assessed. For example, in the 2005 case “Collectif 
                                                          
                                                          
84  R. Abraham, Conclusions sur CE, 22 September 1997, Mlle Cinar, supra 
note 29, p. 564. 
85  CE, Ass., 19 April 1991, Belgacem et Dame Babas, Rec. Lebon, p. 152. 
contre les nuisances du TGV de Chasseneuil du Poi-
tou et Migne-Auxences, Association Linars Nouere 
Charente”86, the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ only controlled 
domestic law with regard to Para. 1 and 2 and judged 
that these stipulations do not impose organisation of a 
‘public debate’87. In fact, these two paragraphs do not 
mean that such a debate has to be held. But, according 
to academics, Para. 4 does oblige organisation of a 
‘public debate’. However, as mentioned above, the 
‘Conseil d’Etat’ denies direct effect to paragraph 4 
and, as a consequence, do not control domestic law to 
Para. 4. Thus, we cannot conclude that French law 
complies with Para. 4; the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ simply did 
not control it. Moreover, according to Yann Aguila, 
“Article 9, […], foresees that every person, whose 
information and participation rights are violated, can 
have access to a remedy: we could wonder whether 
denying direct effect to certain stipulations, that pre-
vent the Convention’s invocability by individuals, is 
not, an obstacle to the right to have access to a rem-
edy”88. 
If Art. 6(4) was controlled, non-compliance might 
arise. This seems to be the position of some French 
academics89. The legal problem here is to know 
whether French law complies with Art. 6(4) of the 
Aarhus Convention or not. In the field of environ-
mental matters, there are generally two kinds of public 
participation procedures, i.e. the ‘public enquiry’ and 
the ‘public debate’. For the project submitted to An-
nex I of the Convention, a public enquiry is always 
planned. However, this procedure has been criticised 
for a long time by both academics and members of the 
administration90 for taking place too late in the proce-
86  CE, 20 April 2005, Collectif contre les nuisances du TGV de Chasseneuil du 
Poitou et Migne-Auxences, Association Linars Nouere Charente, n° 258968 
and 259221. This position is confirmed in the CE case, 28 December 2005, 
Syndicat d’agglomération nouvelle Ouest-Provence, n° 277128. 
87  For more information about the French public participation framework and its 
limits, see M. Prieur, Droit de l’environnement, p. 112 (5th ed. 2004). “Public 
debate” refers to the “public debate” procedure, which is a procedure used 
for the largest projects, in addition and before the “public enquiry” proce-
dure. 
88  Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 3 October 2008, Commune d’Annecy, supra 
note 81, p. 96: l’“article 9, […], prévoit que toute personne qui estime que les 
droits d’information et de participation ont été méconnus puisse former un 
recours : on pourrait se demander si le fait d’écarter l’effet direct de certai-
nes stipulations, qui a pour effet d’empêcher le justiciable de se prévaloir de 
la convention devant le juge, ne constitue pas un obstacle à ce droit au re-
cours”. 
89  Benedicte Delaunay, law professor from the Tours University. She is a 
specialist in public participation procedures and provided commentary on 
the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ case law with regard to Aarhus in the AJDA, one of the 
best French administrative law journals. Professor Jegouzo, director of the 
AJDA journal and the former director of the CERDEAU, the centre of re-
search of the University Paris I Sorbonne that focuses on environmental law 
advised the French ministry of the environment concerning the bill on public 
enquiries law in 2008.  
90  During the ‘Grenelle de l’environnement’ process (a negotiation process 
about the environment), an expert group wrote a report about environmental 
governance. The French ministry of the environment was part of this expert 
group. On page 69 of the report, the following is proposed: “To develop the 
consultation of the public [such as public debate] early in the elaboration 
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dure. According to Professor Michel Prieur91, “the 
main inconvenience of the current system is that it 
only allows the participation of the public at the end 
of the procedure, at a time when the applicant consid-
ers its project as a final project. […] it would have 
been much better to plan an earlier participation of 
the public, when it is still possible to amend the pro-
ject”92. As a consequence, the main problem is to 
know whether a project for which there is only a ‘pub-
lic enquiry’, i.e. without ‘public debate’, complies 
with Art. 6(4). Benedicte Delaunay has written: “the 
‘public debate’ procedure allows an early public 
participation in the decision making process […]. The 
‘public enquiry’ procedure partially complies with the 
principles, but it comes late in the decision making 
process, when the main characteristics of the project 
are already fixed. As a consequence, we can doubt 
that the only submission of a project to a ‘public en-
quiry’ would be enough to guarantee effective public 
participation in decision making”93. ‘Effective par-
ticipation’94 is exactly what is required under 
                                                                                        
Art. 6(4).  
Moreover, according to Professor Jegouzo, the stipula-
tions of Art. 6 “impose a global reorganization of the 
information and participation procedures”95. More-
over, “a detailed examination of current procedures 
’. If not, French 
                                                          
procedure of plans, and not only at the end of the procedure [public inquiry]” 
(Group 5 report, Construire une démocratie écologique: Institutions et gou-
vernance, September 2007, p. 69, available at http://www.grenelle-
environnement.gouv.fr). This proposal has been notably made by the IGE, 
‘Inspection Générale de l’Environnement’, which is the internal inspection 
department of the French ministry of the environment. It clearly shows that 
public inquiries come at the end of the procedure.  
91  Michel Prieur is a law professor. He created the French Environmental Law 
Review (RJE) and the French Society for Environmental Law (SFDE) in 
1976. He was vice-chair of the working group of the ‘Grenelle de 
l’environnement’ relating to Environmental Governance in 2007. 
92  M. Prieur, Droit de l’environnement, p. 91 (5th ed. 2004): “Le système actuel 
présente l’inconvénient majeur de ne permettre la participation du public 
qu’en fin de procédure, à un moment où le pétitionnaire considère son projet 
comme définitif. Certes, l’administration peut lui imposer des modifications à 
la suite de l’enquête publique. Mais, il eût été plus satisfaisant de prévoir la 
participation du public plus en amont dans le processus à un moment où il 
est encore possible d’amender le projet”. 
93  B. Delaunay, La convention d’Aarhus n’implique pas obligatoirement 
l’organisation d’un débat public, observations sous CE, 20 April 2005, Col-
lectif contre les nuisances du TGV de Chasseneuil du Poitou et Migne-
Auxences, Association Linars Nouere Charente, n° 258968 et 259221, AJ-
DA 1787 – 1791 (2005), p. 1791: “La procédure du débat public permet une 
participation très en amont du processus décisionnel […] La procédure de 
l’enquête publique satisfait, en partie, aux principes posés, mais elle 
n’intervient que tardivement dans le processus décisionnel, à un stade où le 
projet a déjà été arrêté dans ses lignes essentielles. On peut donc douter 
que la simple soumission d’un projet à enquête publique permette de garan-
tir la participation effective du public au processus décisionnel”. 
94  Once again, we can note an issue of translation: the French version trans-
lates “effective participation can take place” by “que le public peut exercer 
une réelle influence”, which literally could be translated by “that the public 
can have a real influence”. Once again, French lawyers and English lawyers 
do not speak about the same Convention. The words ‘effective’ and ‘real 
influence’ can be interpreted in lots of different ways. 
95  Y. Jegouzo, L’enquête publique en débat, in Etudes offertes au professeur 
René Hostiou, 2008, p. 280: “imposent une réorganisation globale des pro-
cédures d’information et de participation”. 
shows that French law complies with international 
and European law when a public debate or a consul-
tation is organised at the beginning of the process. In 
these cases, French law complies with the Aarhus 
Convention and Article 6(4) of the 27 June 1985 di-
rective which plan that the public should be able to 
participate in decision making before the public en-
quiry. The problem is only relevant for certain kinds 
of decisions which are included in the Aarhus Conven-
tion and the 27 June directive scopes of application 
and for which the decision making process only plan a 
public enquiry. The public enquiry does not provide 
early information and does not provide a public par-
ticipation for the design of the project. The solution 
for this kind of project is for it to be submitted, in 
addition to the public enquiry, to the public debate or 
to an early consultation of the public. These proce-
dures usually play this role”96. As a result, it is quite 
clear that when a project is submitted to the Annex I 
of the Aarhus Convention, a ‘public debate’ shall be 
organised prior to the ‘public enquiry
law does not comply with Art. 6(4).  
This was exactly the case with an incinerators’ project 
at Fos-sur-mer, in the south of France. Those in charge 
of the project had been sued before the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’. The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ denied direct effect to 
Art. 6(4)97. As a consequence, applicants choose to go 
before the Aarhus Convention compliance commit-
tee98. The argument developed above, i.e. the non-
compliance of French law with Art. 6(4), has also 
been used by the applicant99. As far as we could read 
the draft findings of the compliance committee, it 
appears that the committee does not directly answer 
this argument, i.e. the committee focuses on the num-
ber of enquiries, instead of assessing the ‘public en-
quiry’ procedure itself to determine whether it is suffi-
cient for compliance with Art. 6(4)100. However, this 
is based on ‘draft’ findings and it remains necessary to 
96  Y. Jegouzo, L’enquête publique en débat, supra note 95, p. 280: “Un 
examen plus attentif des procédures en vigueur en droit français conduit à 
penser que les obligations issues du droit international et du droit commu-
nautaire sont satisfaites dans toutes les hypothèses où la décision est pré-
cédée (ou peut l’être) dès le début du processus par une procédure de dé-
bat public ou une concertation. Dans ces hypothèses est assuré le respect 
tant de la Convention d’Aarhus que du paragraphe 4 de l’article 6 de la di-
rective du 27 juin 1985 qui exigent que le public puisse participer au proces-
sus de décision en amont de l’enquête publique. Le problème ne se pose 
donc que pour un certain nombre de décisions entrant dans le champ 
d’application de la Convention d’Aarhus et de la directive du 27 juin 1985 et 
dont la procédure ne comporte que l’enquête publique qui ne permet ni 
d’assurer une information sur les premières phases des projets ni de faire 
participer le public à leur conception. La solution à laquelle on pense en 
premier est d’étendre à ces projets les procédures de débat public ou de 
concertation qui jouent habituellement ce role”. 
97  CE, 28 December 2005, Syndicat d’agglomération nouvelle Ouest-
Provence, supra note 86. 
98  See communication ACCC/C/2007/22, available at   
http://www.unece.org/env/pp. 
99  Para. 3.3 and 3.4 of the communication. 
100  § 41 of the draft findings, unpublished.  
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look at the final decision of the compliance commit-
tee101. Thus, it seems that the ‘Conseil d’Etat’ and the 
Aarhus Convention’s compliance committee are look-
ing at each other in this respect102 and remain reserved 
about answering the sensitive question of the applica-
s Convention provisions 
                                                          
tion of Art. 6(4).  
4 Conclusion 
Direct effect and compliance issues show the need for 
the Aarhus Convention to be interpreted. Interpreta-
tion is the key to effectiveness. Eight years after it 
entered into force, the exact reach of the Convention is 
still not fixed. In fact, the Convention can have a real 
impact only if the exact content of the obligations is 
known. The ‘Conseil d’Etat’ determines the treaties’ 
direct effect provision by provision. Moreover, its 
interpretation of the Aarhu
appears to be restrictive.103  
Thus, French judges remain “shy” about the Aarhus 
Convention. Even if “the constitutional principle of 
the separation of powers prohibits judges from taking 
administrative action”104, part of their role is to apply 
binding international law. It is not a matter of address-
ing injunctions to the state and involving itself in 
political affairs. A positive step to prevent the viola-
tion of the legality principle would be to recognise the 
treaties’ invocability in order to allow the cancellation 
of domestic law acts that do not comply with it. How-
ever, an adjacent issue is to know which body has to 
pronounce on the Aarhus Convention’s direct effect. 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is usually a do-
mestic prerogative. But, in addition to its fear of in-
volving itself in political power, this task would be too 
great for the ‘Conseil d’Etat’, if one considers the high 
number of international treaties. Giving this task to 
international bodies poses other problems. First, the 
Aarhus Convention’s compliance committee does not 
have the means to face a large number of ‘communi-
cations’105. Its rules of procedure allow great access to 
mpliance committee could follow the ECJ case 
ultilateral environmental agree-
ments in one body109. 
                                                          
101  This article was written at the end of August 2009. At that time, the final 
decision was not available. This decision shall be published online at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp. 
102  Yann Aguila on the Aarhus Convention’s compliance committee: “A compli-
ance committee has been created at the first meeting of the Parties. It can 
look at every ‘communication’ of the public, and is currently examining a 
complaint against France concerning the construction of an incinerator at 
Fos-sur-mer” (Y. Aguila, Conclusions sur CE, 3 October 2008, Commune 
d’Annecy, supra note 81, p. 94: “Un comité d’examen du respect de ses dis-
positions a d’ailleurs été créé lors de la première réunion des Parties, […]. Il 
peut examiner toute ‘communication’ émanant du public, et il est d’ailleurs 
actuellement saisi d’une plainte contre la France dans le cadre de la réalisa-
tion d’un incinérateur à Fos-sur-Mer”). 
103  A comparative study of the Aarhus Convention direct effect before States 
parties’ courts would be useful to confirm our understanding  of the ‘Conseil 
d’Etat’ interpretation. 
104  Second Implementation Report submitted by France, 
ECE/MP.PP/IR/2008/FRA, 4 April 2008, § 143, p. 23, available in English at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/mop3/. 
105  It should be noted that members of the compliance committee are volun-
teers. ‘Communications’ are the equivalent of ‘complaints’. 
individuals, which is quite rare in an international 
context106. As a result, it is important for the compli-
ance committee to remain focused on the main issues 
of interpretation. However, as a specialised body insti-
tutionalised by the meeting of the parties, the Aarhus 
Convention’s compliance committee is probably the 
most legitimate body in terms of stating which stipula-
tions of the Convention produce direct effects. Thus, 
the co
law.  
According to Jean-Yves Chérot, “ECJ decided that a 
question always seen by international jurisdictions as 
a domestic law issue was a European law ques-
tion”107, i.e. the ECJ allowed itself to interpret Euro-
pean law, notably the direct effect issue. More produc-
tive than wondering which judge would be the right 
one for pronouncing on it would be the creation of 
paths of dialogue between these different bodies. Ide-
ally, there would be a procedure for national judges to 
pose a question to the Aarhus Convention’s compli-
ance committee, as they can do with ECJ. However, 
taking into account the proliferation of international 
bodies, it seems impossible for national jurisdictions 
to create a dialogue with every international body such 
as the Aarhus Convention’s compliance committee108. 
Thus, the effectiveness of international law requires 
improvement of the paths of the coherence between 
national and international bodies. A possible step that 
might be explored would be to unite all the compli-
ance committees of m
106  For example, the Kyoto Protocol compliance committee is not open to 
individuals’ communications.  
107  J. Y. Cherot, Le droit dans un ordre juridique faiblement ordonné. Le cas de 
l’Union Européenne, in Mélanges en l’honneur de Bruno Genevois, Le dia-
logue des juges 175 – 184 (2009), p. 176: “la Cour a decide que relevait 
d’une question de droit de l’Union une question que les juridictions interna-
tionales avaient toujours considéré comme relevant de la seule competence 
des constitutions nationales”. 
108  See E. Decaux, Que manque-t-il aux quasi-juridictions internationales pour 
dire le droit?, in Mélanges en l’honneur de Bruno Genevois, Le dialogue des 
juges 217 – 232 (2009), p. 217.  
109  On the issue of the unity of international law, see the remarkable article: P. 
M. Dupuy, The danger of fragmentation or unification of international legal 
system and international court of justice, 31 New York University Journal of 
International law and politics 791 – 807 (1999). In the article mentioned 
above (supra note 108), Emmanuel Decaux proposes to consolidate human 
rights bodies into one body only at international level. 
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